Restless Desire: Autonomy or Subordination? 

Where can we find examples of analysands facing a similar dilemma and analysts continuing to analyze?  Very relevant is the work of feminist psychoanalysts treating analysands experiencing penis envy.  In “The Significance of Penis Envy in Women,” Maria Torok began as follows: 

It is none the less true that in analysis, the woman's desire to have a penis (that is to say, to be a man) reveals itself as a subterfuge, because of its envious character. A desire can be satisfied, envy never can. Envy can bring about only more envy and destruction. Pseudo-desire, promulgated by envy, achieves a semblance of satisfaction, as shown in the phallic attitudes of some women, who are immersed in imitation of the other sex, or at least of the image they have of it. The fragile structure which they build shelters only feelings of inner void, anxiety, and frustration. [1] [emphasis added] 

Here Torok distinguishes between desire and envy, between satisfaction and its semblance.  Zizek does not, likely reflecting his emphasis on the idea that there is no desire that is authentic since all desire flows from the ego’s misidentifications.  What I will show is that because he overlooks this distinction, he is effectively oblivious to the discrete character of narcissistic desire, and the fixated destructiveness that is part of it.     

Torok continues: 

The problem of analysis is precisely to bring back into the open the authentic but repressed desire which, disguised as envy, has remained hidden.  Here, as with other fantasies, if one took the patient's protestations literally one would preclude analysis. A sure way of doing this would be to legitimatize woman's penis envy through accepting an alleged castration as her lot, for which phylogenesis would bear the  responsibility…. For the analyst who dares face up to this impasse in treatment—namely penis envy—the first step is to clarify the nature of the conflict which produced such a desperate solution. He should not underestimate the advantages which it unfailingly provides, and he should utilize in treatment the painful contradictions in which it inevitably locks the patient…Penis envy is the symptom, not of an illness, but of a certain state of unfulfilled desire – unfulfilled because of conflicting needs. [2] [emphasis added] 

Torok investigated a form of envy in female analysands that serves to imprison them in a state of desire for something they cannot have.  Torok refused to accept this as a “bedrock” condition [3] of the female sex, and also notes that “patients of both sexes” can become trapped in this position.  Agreeing with Torok, I will argue this is useful in understanding Kris’ male patient.   

Torok quotes two of her analysands:  

"I don't know why I have this feeling," says Agnes, "as it corresponds to nothing in reality but it has always been like this  for me As though, only man was fit to fulfill himself, to have  opinions, to mature, to go always further. And everything to  him is so naturally easy . . . nothing, nothing can stop him  he is a force that can stop anything if he wants to. Me, I  am getting nowhere, hesitating, there's a kind of wall in front of me. ... I always had the feeling I wasn't finished.   Like a statue waiting for the sculptor to decide at last to model its arms. ..."  

A little girl, Yvonne, always thought that boys "could at once   succeed in doing anything . . . they instantly speak all languages . . they could go into a church and take all the can   candles and nobody would stop them. If ever they find some   thing in the way, they would naturally jump over it.”   These are eloquent descriptions of an idealized penis. It is obvious that this always means: "the thing whatever it is that one doesn't have oneself." Yet such a vital detect could not be a natural one, but could only be the effect of a deprivation or a renunciation. 

She then offers this formulation, which I will quote at length:  

“A complex, unconscious speech is concentrated in "penis envy," and this speech is addressed to the maternal imago [the analysand’s psychological representation of her mother]. One could expound it by the following propositions: 

1) "You see, it is in a thing and not in myself that I am looking for what I am deprived of." 

2) "I am searching in vain, because this thing can never be mine. The obvious vanity of my search must be a guarantee of the definitive renunciation of those desires you disapproved in me." 

3) "I shall insist on the value of this inaccessible thing so that you may realize the greatness of my sacrifice in letting myself be deprived of my desire." 

4) "I should accuse you and, in turn, deprive you, but that is precisely what I want to avoid, deny, and ignore, because I need your love."

"In short, idealizing the penis, in order to envy it more, is reassuring you by showing you that this [my sexual desires not distorted through penis envy] will never come between us,  and that consequently I shall never be reunified, I shall never fulfill  myself. I tell you, it would be just as impossible as changing bodies." 

"Penis envy" marks this oath of fidelity… One can now see that it is not the "thing" itself that the patient is coveting, but the acts which allow one to master "things" in general. Coveting a thing is precisely the same as demonstrating to the imago the renunciation of an act… To conclude, we are led to consider that not only the repression of anal-pregenital conflicts underlies penis envy, but also a specific, total or partial, inhibition of masturbation, of orgasm, and of their concomitant fantasy activities. Penis envy appears now to be a disguised claim—not for the organ and the attributes of the other sex—but for one's own desires for maturation and development by means of the encounter with oneself in conjunction with orgiastic experience and sexual identification.” [4]  

Coveting what one can never have replaces action based on desire.  This resonates strongly with Kris’ analysand, the plagiarist who, instead of simply stealing and getting, unconsciously gives his own work to the person he believes he is plagiarizing, then moves to desire it, and then feels ambivalently – excited, yet guilty –  trapped in the position of thief.  Regardless that he has a penis, he has established a symbolic lack, like the women experiencing penis envy, that he cannot overcome, and he thereby maintains a dependent tie to the parent whose phallus he needs.   But in the same stance, he also expresses the claim to that potency, transgressively framed as an act of stealing.  The affective ensemble of excitement and guilt that Kris saw in his analysand expresses both the thrill of possibly acquiring phallic potency and a countervailing assertion acknowledging the transgression involved; via guilt the potency of the paternal position is additionally represented as the call of conscience.  

What keeps the analysand in this position?  One component Torok highlights is the forestalled identification with mother: 

the little girl possessed a means by which she could have indirectly recovered what she had been deprived of, namely identification with the Mother, sovereign of her powers. But one notices that penis envy testifies to a total lack of identification. To conclude, we are led to consider that not only the repression of anal-pregenital conflicts that underlies penis envy, but also a specific, total or partial, inhibition of masturbation, of orgasm, and of their concomitant fantasy activities. Penis envy appears now to be a disguised claim—not for the organ and the attributes of the other sex—but for one's own desires for maturation and development by means of the encounter with oneself in conjunction with orgiastic experience and sexual identification. [5]   [emphasis added] 

Here what Zizek calls authenticity looks like arrested development. [6]    Because it is organized around renunciation of identification with adults, this notion of authenticity remains mired in the child’s understanding of herself-with-her-parents.  Not willful authenticity, but rather ambivalent  dependence prevails.  Kris’ analysand, like those of Torok, does not follow through on the transitions associated with the Oedipal passage.  Instead of identifying with father and simultaneously renouncing his current claims for the father’s potency even as he prospectively claims his own in the future, as a child Kris’ analysand-to-be settles into a counter-identification as a never-to-be-successful thief of the father’s potency.  In this bargain, the analysand trades the prospective possession of the  capacities and joys of adulthood (necessarily mundane and conformist?) for the thrills Zizek associates with jouissance.  Here I would stress that – when we consider the full clinical presentation of analysands who are in this position – it appears to unavoidably carry with it confusion, guilt and a sense, like Torok’s analysands, of narcissistic deficit.   

Once we are able to take up the details of a case and to consider a more complete psychoanalytic rendering, or embodiment, of Zizek’s metapsychological propositions, the escape from stupid contentment to restless authenticity ends in a bog of illusory fascination and anguish.   Instead of somehow harnessing the disattaching function of the death drive to achieve authenticity, these analysands remain in infantalized positions wherein the mundane exercise of adult capacities, including sexuality,  is distorted and blocked through unconscious idealization and anxiety-limiting avoidance.   

The Sinthome over the Symptome: Madness-jouissance for All

Other passages in Zizek’s writings help in understanding how he arrives at a conception of authenticity consistent with Kris’ analysand’s fixation on a lack of/stealing the phallus.  Following his reading of Lacan, a basic revision of psychoanalytic goals is necessary: 

The aim of psychoanalysis is to reestablish the broken network of communication by allowing the patient to verbalize the meaning of his symptom: through this verbalization, the symptom is automatically dissolved…In its very constitution, the symptom implies the field of the big Other, as consistent, complete, because its very formation is an appeal to the Other which contains its meanings….why, in spite of its interpretation, does the symptom not dissolve itself?…The Lacanian answer is, of course, enjoyment. … 

In this way we can also articulate two stages of the psychoanalysis process: interpretation of symptoms – going through fantasy.  When we are confronted with the patient’s symptoms, we must first interpret them and penetrate through them to the fundamental fantasy as the kernel of enjoyment which is blocking the further movement of interpretation; then we must accomplish the crucial step of going through the fantasy, of obtaining distance from it, of experiencing how the fantasy-formation just masks, fills out a certain void, lack, empty place in the Other.   But here again another problem arose: how do we account for patients who have…gone through their fantasy…but whose key symptoms persist?…What do we do with a symptom, with this pathological formation which persists not only beyond its interpretation but even beyond fantasy?  Lacan tried to answer this challenge with the concept of sinthome…Symptom as sinthome is a certain signifying formation penetrated with enjoyment: it is a signifier as a bearer  of jouis-sense, enjoyment-in-sense. 

What we must bear in mind here is the radical ontological status of symptom: symptom, conceived as sinthome, is literally our only substance, the only positive support of our being, the only point that gives consistency to the subject.  In other words, symptom is the way we – the subjects – “avoid madness,” the way we ‘choose something (the symptom formation) instead of nothing (radical psychotic autism, the destruction of the symbolic universe)’ through the binding of our enjoyment to a certain signifying, symbolic formation which assures a minimum of consistency to our being-in-the-world. [7]  

These passages effectively reformulate the goals of psychoanalysis: the ground of the distressing symptoms of the analysand is the sinthome, which is psychostructurally essential in avoiding madness.   Analysands sense this, and will not give up the jouissance, the enjoyment that saves them from insanity.  This means that  

If the symptom in this radical dimension is unbound, it means literally “the end of the world” – the only alternative to the symptom is nothing: pure autism, a psychic suicide…that is why the final Lacanian definition of the end of the psychoanalytic process is identification with the symptom.  The analysis achieves its end when the patient is able to recognize, in the Real of his symptom, the only support of his being. [8]  

However, does the sinthome/madness binary really describe both the ontological and psychoanalytic options facing Kris and Torok and their analysands?  Or, is the traditional psychoanalytic goal of the interpretive dissolution of symptoms yet relevant? [9]   Consider Martha, analyzed by Torok:    

During several sessions Martha has violent bursts of crying or laughing. Slowly, her emotions regain a meaning;  when a little girl, she met some boys in the swimming pool.   Since then she often repeats the same phrase: "I cannot live like this." 

It was this phrase which came up, during her analysis,  in moments of deep depression. Consciously, "this" means  "being deprived of a penis." But we must also understand  that, on that occasion, she "squeezed her thighs together,"  "rolled up a little bit of swimsuit inside" and felt a kind of  "sensitive shiver." The laughter mixed with tears (mingled  joy and guilt) reflected her idea: if I am made "this" way  (feeling this shiver) then, "at home, will they want me?"  At puberty, the same patient had such a feeling of guilt toward  her mother that she kept her periods — the sign of her genital maturity — a secret from her mother for a whole year.  Her own sexuality, far from being ignored, was a constant  but latent, preoccupation; in those days, the need to please her  mother was greater than orgastic pleasure. During the sessions she  expressed the desire for an orgasm, through the fits of laughter but  repressed it through penis envy itself. First of all there had been an indescribable joy," "an immense hope." Then, she does not  know why, she was convinced that "something infinitely desirable exists, not in me but over there, not in my body but in an object, an absolutely inaccessible object." One can see the contradiction: the  sensitive “shiver of infinite goodness" makes the little girl lose her feeling of being good for the sake of her family.  The penis is then felt, as we shall see, to be the "good" sex which gives the possessor pleasure without guilt; this pleasure is not tied up with masturbatory or internalized guilt. It has all the conditions of a perfect harmony: pleasure for oneself and harmony with others.  Feeling the "shiver" is aggressive, wicked to others. So all that is "good" is abandoned and an external object substituted – the idealized penis. The void thus created in the patient is filled by sadness, bitterness, jealousy. But this smoldering aggression can never be a substitute for what she has missed, the growing and voluptuous awakenings of maturity. Only analysis can arouse those feelings by loosening up machinery, as it were. [10]  

Instead of the abstract condition of “madness,” or “radical psychotic autism, the destruction of the symbolic universe,” the most disorganized experiences of Martha in her sessions involved a dizzying confluence of emotions.  She felt joy, anxiety, hope, guilt, and anger that reflected the run of psychological states associated with intense conflicts over her emerging sexuality.  As they developed in sessions these states might feel “crazy,” but they do not develop into psychosis.  Prior to analysis, the idea that she lacked a penis served to organize these states within a depressive container that in its core contained an impossible idealization: the penis/phallus that represents a wondrous resolution of all the conflicts in her “real” life.   Psychoanalysis of this symptom/sinthome did not lead to madness, but to recovery of both sexual and relationship capacities, organized around an experience of herself as an adult woman.

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[1] Maria Torok, “The Significance of Penis Envy in Women,” in Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, ed. Female Sexuality: New Psychoanalytic Views, Karnac: London 1970, pps. 135 – 170.

[2] Ibid, p. 135-138, passim.

[3] The term “bedrock condition” refers to the notion that “not having a penis” is an essential fact of being a woman, and that analysis of a woman’s conflicts over this fact would basically aim at helping her adjust to it.  This idea was challenged by writers such as Horney and Jones in the 1930s, and then effectively debunked by another wave of criticism in the 1970s.  For examples of the latter see Torok, op cit; Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, (1976),  “Freud and Female Sexuality—The Consideration of Some Blind Spots in the Exploration of the 'Dark Continent.”  International Journal of Psychoanalysis., 57:275-286; William I. Grossman, M.D.  and Walter A. Stewart, M.D. (1976) “Penis Envy:  From Childhood Wish To Developmental Metaphor.””  Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association., 24S:193-212. For a useful summary of those criticisms, see Shahla Chehrazi, (1986) Female Psychology: A Review.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association., 34:141-162.

[4] Torok, pps. 140-141.

[5] ibid, 142.

[6] Here I would like to distinguish this line of argument from objections that have been raised concerning psychoanalytic developmental theory as a succession of psychosexual stages leading to normative heterosexuality.  In this discussion, “arrested development” expresses a fixation on patterns of desire directed towards the parents in which an identification with them, one that allows a supersession of powerful child-parent fantasies, has been forestalled.  Identification with the parent as part of emancipation from the child-parent relationship is more the issue here.

[7] Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, New York: Verso, 1989. Pps. 73-75 passim.

[8] ibid, p. 75. 

[9] The psychoanalytic process inevitably involves more than symptom interpretation.  Much of the current debate within psychoanalysis is over the extent to which processes set in motion by the analytic relationship – for example, the analysand feeling approved/loved by the relatively tolerant analyst – should be somehow formally incorporated and drawn upon as part of the process, as opposed to accepted as an inevitable, hopefully useful, accompaniment.  For example, see Busch, F. (1995).  Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? A Query Into An Enigma In Analytic Theory And Technique.  Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association., 43:61-82; Novick, J. and Novick, K. K. (2000).  Love in the Therapeutic Alliance.  Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association., 48:189-218; Hanly, C. (1994).  Reflections on the Place of the Therapeutic Alliance in Psychoanalysis.  International Journal of Psychoanalysis., 75:457-467.

[10] Torok, p. 143.